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ermany is running a current account of about 8% of GDP, which means that about one-
third of all German savings (equal to 24% of GDP) has to be invested abroad every year. 
It has become by now almost a cliché that these huge excess savings are being wasted 
abroad. But this is a popular misconception based on the divergence between the available data 
on the (cumulated) current account balance (cCAB) of Germany and its net international 
investment position (NIIP). A closer look at the data actually suggests that the NIIP is probably 
not measured correctly and that the observed returns on German investment abroad have 
remained above most domestic returns. 
Indeed, in comparing the cCAB to the NIIP, one finds a substantial ‘gap’: by now (end 2015), the 
cumulated current account surpluses of Germany are nearly €600 billion higher than the NIIP. 
Germany is one of the few countries for which 2015 data are already available and one can clearly 
see the gap (Figure 1).  
Figure 1. Rising gap between cumulated cCAB and NIIP in Germany vs Spain, 1995-2015 (€ billion) 
Germany                  Spain
 
Note: Cumulated from 1995 until 2015 for Germany and until 2014 for Spain. In the data for 
Germany, both measures are based on BPM6, while the NIIP for Spain also includes BPM5 data 
(the measures for Spain for the years with both observations do not differ greatly). 
Source: Own calculations based on 2015 data from the Bundesbank and Eurostat. 
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A first point to note is that a similar gap can be observed for most EU countries.  For example, 
the Spanish data show a NIIP that is over €200 billion worse than the cCAB figure. The gap is 
smaller in absolute terms than that for Germany, but larger as a percent of GDP. No one is 
arguing, however, that Spanish savers are wasting their money by investing abroad (or that 
foreign investors are making extraordinary returns in the country).  
Busse & Gros (2016) show that many other countries record similar gaps between the cCAB 
and the NIIP of similar relative magnitudes. There is thus no convincing reason why Germany 
should be singled out. The narrative of the wasteful German investor thus hinges on the 
precision of the current account and NIIP data. Current account data are usually assumed to 
be rather reliable, but the NIIP is subject to very large measurement errors since the net 
position is calculated as the difference between two very large stocks (total foreign assets and 
liabilities), both of which are imperfectly measured.  
Given these problems with the reported NIIP, we propose to look at an alternative measure of 
the investment performance: the investment income balance, i.e. overall income balance after 
deducting remittances and other non-investment income. This can be thought of as the return 
on the NIIP. Since 2003, Germany’s investment income balance has moved from a persistently 
balanced position to a large surplus of around 2% of GDP, not far behind Japan. In Europe 
only Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands show higher values.   
The main evidence against the thesis that Germany is wasting its savings abroad is thus that 
the (measured) returns on German investment abroad have held up rather well. Even today 
this yield is over 4%, while German government bonds have a negative yield up to 7 years of 
maturity and even bank loans to non-financial companies carry a lower interest rate. The 
conclusion by Bach et al. (2013) in a DIW study and others that Germany is losing its shirt 
abroad and would gain from more investment at home is thus not supported by the data.  
Figure 2a.Yields in comparison   2b. Return on asset and liability position 
 
Data source: Eurostat, 2015. 
The relatively high return on the net assets position is not only due to a superior performance 
of German investment abroad, but also to the very low return on foreign investment in 
Germany. The detailed data confirm that German investors managed to earn a relatively high 
positive return on their foreign assets, which exceeds that paid to foreign investors in Germany 
(Figure 2b). One could thus conclude that German savers are actually doing better than their 
foreign peers. If the returns on assets and liabilities were the same, Germany's investment 
income surplus would be cut by one-half.   
The obvious objection to the data on returns is that they could also be affected by measurement 
errors. But the data on returns on assets and liabilities separately look much more reasonable 
and would not be affected by a +/- 10 measurement error, which would change a return from 
3.3 to 3.0%, but would not affect the sign. 
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The data thus contradict the widely held notion that Germany lost out by the euro-area rescue 
mechanisms that provided the periphery with hundreds of billions of euro in debt at very low 
rates and that German savings would have been better used at home. On the contrary, it seems 
that Germany's returns on its net asset position has held up well and remains much higher 
than domestic returns.   
The key reason for this is that Germany's part in the euro rescue operations was much smaller 
(at less than 30%) than its claims towards the periphery.  Germany has basically been able to 
rope in the rest of the euro area to provide about 70% of the cheap financing that had to be 
provided for the euro periphery, although these other countries (Italy, France, etc.) held only 
a fraction of the claims against the periphery. Consequently German savers have fared quite 
well over the last decade in their foreign investments. This is what one would expect after all: 
with the euro crisis, risk premia rose throughout the periphery, but there were no large losses 
except in Greece, which accounts only for a fraction of German foreign investment. Moreover, 
rates fell in Germany. It was thus to be expected that foreign investment would become more 
attractive than domestic investment once the initial panic had abated. 
The data on returns thus suggest that German savers are putting such a large fraction of their 
savings abroad because the returns there are simply higher. 
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